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Differentiation Strategies in Vertical Channels: 
A Case Study from the Market for Fresh Produce 
 
Research paper 
 
Purpose – Twofold: first, to review the literature in order to assess the opportunities and the 
possible welfare effects of differentiation strategies in the food market; second, to analyse the 
current structure and organisation of the fresh produce market (fruit, vegetable, and salad) in 
the light of new product procurement, innovation, and differentiation policies carried out by 
retailers at the global level. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – Single dyadic case study across two countries (Italy and 
the UK): the primary producer is engaged in 'partner' supply to a principal category 
management intermediary for channel leading multiple retailers. 
 
Findings – First, equilibrium in differentiated markets are not stable, and a welfare 
assessment is difficult. Second, a differentiation strategy in the market for fresh produce 
might benefit retailers more than in other sectors, which seem to be consistent with the 
theoretical findings. Third, when retailers engage in product differentiation it is more likely 
that channel relationships shift from collaborative to competitive types, with the power 
imbalance becoming the disciplinary means by which vertical coordination is achieved and 
maintained. 
 
Research limitations – Single case study. 
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Practical implications – For suppliers it could be wise agreeing to some inequity as the cost 
of doing business, especially when smart large retailers carry out successfully competitive 
strategies with positive spill over effects on the upstream firms. 
 
Originality/value of the paper – Using the industrial economic literature on the effects of 
differentiation strategies (horizontal and vertical differentiation) on market structure, firms' 
performance, and welfare effects, this paper analyses case findings from a study in the fresh 
produce industry. 
 
Keywords – fresh produce; product differentiation; channel structure and management; 
category management; case study. 
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Introduction 
 
The current differentiation strategies in the fresh produce (fruit, vegetable, and salad) industry 
are analysed in the light of new procurement policies carried out by retailers at the global 
level. These retailers pay growing attention to product differentiation and innovation as a 
means to put new value (rather than simply ripping out costs) into the supply chain.  
 
Differentiation strategies are analysed. On a theoretical level, the main findings of the 
literature on product differentiation and market structure are reviewed in order to assess the 
opportunities and the possible welfare effects of differentiation strategies in the food market. 
On an empirical level, the current structure and organisation of the fresh produce market are 
analysed, using both data at the aggregate level and the findings of a case study. The case 
study refers to a single dyadic case approach, in which a primary producer is engaged in 
'partner' supply to a principal category management intermediary for channel leading multiple 
retailers. 
 
The findings of the study indicate that in the fresh produce industry there are good 
opportunities for successful differentiation strategies. Nevertheless, actors at the different 
vertical stages of the marketing channel take very different advantage from it, depending on 
their 'power' to lead the channel. Moreover, the fact that product differentiation tends to foster 
the oligopolistic structure of the market might have general negative welfare effects. 
 
Product Differentiation and Market Structure 
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Differentiation strategies are pervasive in market economies and are a powerful means of 
obtaining competitive advantages. This is because the 'master' of competitive advantage 
offers superior value which "stems from offering lower prices than competitors for equivalent 
benefits; or providing unique benefits that more than offset a higher price" (Porter, 1985: p. 
3). Firms create value by cost leadership or differentiation (Porter, 1985). Using the latter 
strategy, firms differentiate their product to avoid ruinous price competition and seek some 
form of monopoly rent. Differentiation offers firms market power, naturally resolving the 
Bertrand paradox (whereby two undifferentiated players reduce price in order to capture the 
market but find themselves in a state of Nash equilibrium- without profit).  
 
The industrial economic literature focuses on the effects of differentiation strategies on 
market structure, firms' performances, and welfare effects (Beath and Katsoulacos, 1991). A 
basic tenet is the distinction made between horizontal and vertical differentiation. Products 
are said to be horizontally differentiated when, if offered at the same price, consumers, if 
asked to do so, would rank them differently showing different preferences for different 
varieties. Instead, they are said to be vertically differentiated if, when offered at the same 
price, all consumer choose to purchase the same one, that of highest quality. 
 
Horizontal and vertical differentiation leads to quite different general results in terms of 
market structure. Horizontal differentiation is the implicit assumption at the core of models of 
monopolistic competition and have basically given rise to two classes of models based on the 
assumption of symmetric consumer preferences (or representative consumer) and asymmetric 
preferences. In the case of symmetric preferences, one brand is an equally good substitute for 
any other and the consumer's actual choice will depend on income and relative prices. When 
preferences are asymmetric, brands are not all equally substitute: if a consumer's ideal brand 
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is i then the consumer prefers brands that are 'near' to i in terms of his specification (i.e., in 
the space of product characteristics in the Lancaster lessicon; more than those that are 'far' 
from it). Asymmetric preferences are assumed in location models, whereas symmetric 
preferences are assumed in models grounded in the Chamberlin paradigm. 
 
The simplest and seminal location model is the Hotelling model of a spatial duopoly, 
sanctioning the famous principle of minimum differentiation. Successive studies have shown 
that the Nash equilibrium in the Hotelling model relies on its restrictive assumption, as the 
zero conjectural variation assumption and the prices and the number of firms being fixed 
exogenously. When these assumptions are relaxed a unique Nash equilibrium does not 
necessarily occurs. D'apremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979), for example, starting from a 
different assumption on the initial location of the firms, show that the Hotelling model allows 
for a solution where the sellers seek to move as far away from each other as possible. In the 
free-entry circular model of Salop (1979) equilibrium is found where each firm earns zero 
profits and firms are symmetrically located around the circumference of the circle. 
 
The Chamberlin (1933) large group model leads to the classical long-run monopolistic 
equilibrium, the one in which profits are zero and the 'dd' curve is tangential to the average 
cost curve. As long as the 'dd' curve that each firm faces still has some negative slope, each 
firm will produce at a point above the level of minimum average cost. Models postulating 
horizontal differentiation generally back equilibria characterised by many firms earning zero 
profits and prices above marginal costs. These models raise the question of whether the 
market will produce too many or too few brands as compared with the social optimal, which 
is the issue previously addressed by Spence (1976). The result is generally a suboptimal 
number of firms/products, with too many or too few firms in the Chamberlin representative 
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consumer model (depending on the parameters of the model) and unambiguously too much 
variety in the localized competition circle model. 
 
While a perfect equilibrium is often problematic in the horizontal case, a perfect equilibrium 
exists in the vertical case consistent with the finiteness property, and stating that at the 
equilibrium there is a limit to the number of products for which price can exceed unit variable 
cost and which have a positive share of the market. The finiteness property was introduced by 
Shaked and Sutton (1983). The markets in which this is a feature of equilibrium are referred 
to as natural oligopolies. In the model of Shaked and Sutton, the two conditions that the unit 
variable costs associated with increased quality rise more slowly than consumers' willingness 
to pay for this and that the main burden of quality improvement falls on fixed rather than 
variable costs. An important development of the previous model of Shaked and Sutton (1987) 
is the one that demonstrates that a weak version of the finiteness property still holds when a 
mix of horizontal and vertical differentiation is accounted for (that is the pervasive situation 
in the real world where product differentiation never falls under the ideal type of vertical or 
horizontal). 
 
Summarising, differentiation is always a source of market imperfection and welfare loss. In 
the case of pure horizontal differentiation these effects are mainly linked to inefficient scales 
of production or to the suboptimal product variety, whereas the market structure approaches 
the competitive one. In the vertical (or mixed) case the negative welfare effects are linked to 
the oligopolistic structure emerging as market equilibrium. The limit theorems describing 
horizontal differentiation state that in the limit as the market gets large enough, an arbitrary 
large number of firms, each with a very small market share could co-exist in equilibrium. 
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When carrying out differentiation policies, firms will be earning supernormal profits even 
though the competitive game is based on the assumptions of non cooperative Bertrand 
behaviour and free-entry. This result is in contrast to both structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm and entry-deterrence theory, and is an example of case where structure (the number 
of the firms) and performance are endogenously determined. 
 
Differentiation and Channel Strategies in the Food Sector 
 
The economic literature just mentioned refers to the analysis of one industry at time, that is, 
on the analysis of competition and market structure at the horizontal level (inter-brand 
competition). In the food sector the set of prices, qualities, and varieties that actually face the 
final consumers depends on the strategies carried out by different actors in different stages of 
the distribution channel. These strategies are the results of horizontal as well as vertical 
competition. Vertical competition has traditionally been addressed by the channel literature 
modelling different channel structure in a manufacturer-retailer relationship. Traditionally, 
three ideal types of structure have been considered (Choi, 1996): exclusive dealer channel 
(one manufacturer supplying one retailer); monopoly common retailer channel (two 
manufacturers supplying the same unique retailer); monopoly manufacturer channel (a unique 
manufacturer supplying two retailers); and duopoly common retailer channel (two 
manufacturers both supplying two retailers).  
 
The topic of channel literature has been the analysis of channel coordination/control problems 
between the manufacturers and its retailers and on the analysis of vertical strategic 
interaction; this latter defined in terms of "the direction of channel member's reaction to the 
action of its channel partners within a given demand structure" (Lee and Staelin, 1997: p. 
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185). Previous literature, taking for granted the bargaining power of manufacturers, has 
focused on the incentive schemes used by manufacturers in order to let the retailers choose 
the strategies able to maximize the channel total profit, while appropriating the largest share 
of it. Choi (1991), for example, quotes the different forms of governance for the achievement 
of the maximum channel profit. Because such studies have generally been applied to non-
grocery sectors with few national brands and frequent exclusive selling agreement, the 
problems of channel coordination with regards to differentiating besides pricing behaviours 
in a multi/manufacturer multi/retailer setting (that is the typical channel setting for the food 
industry), have been paid little attention. Starting with the previous insights of Choi (1991), 
successive works have explicitly addressed the problem of channel coordination and 
differentiation in grocery sectors (Avenel and Caprice, 2006; Choi, 1996; Choi and Couglan, 
2006; Ellickson, 2004; Lee and Staelin, 1997).  
 
Choi (1991) first analyses a channel structure with multiple-brand dealers, called common 
retailers, that well fits the typical structure of food retailing (department stores, supermarkets, 
and convenience stores). He studies a duopoly model of manufacturers who sell their 
products through a common independent retailer. He considers three different rules of the 
duopoly game, which account for different power balance scenario within the channel: 
 A manufacturer Stackelberg game (in which markets are characterised by leaders and 
followers), where the manufacturers can play the role of Stackelberg leaders with respect 
to the retailer by taking the retailer's reaction function into consideration for their 
respective wholesale price decisions;  
 A vertical Nash game, where neither the manufacturer nor the retailer can influence the 
counterpart's price decision (i.e., the manufacturer conditions its wholesale price on the 
retail price and vice-versa); and 
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 A Retailer-Stackelberg game, where retailers play the role of Stackelberg leaders.  
While the first and the third game applies to situations in which few powerful manufacturers 
(retailers) supply (buy from) many retailers (manufacturers), the second game fits a situation 
where power is quite balanced in the relationship. Choi solves these models under both the 
assumption of linearity and nonlinearity of the demand function, finding contradictory 
results. Moreover, he solves the models under different assumption on the degree of product 
substitutability between the manufacturers' brands, in such a way as to introduce the analysis 
of the effect of product differentiation on channel competition. Also in this case the results 
are affected by the form of the demand function; with contradictory results (for instance he 
finds that less differentiation leads to increased prices and profits for all the members of the 
channel). 
 
Choi (1996) extends the previous model by introducing a differentiated duopoly common 
retailer channel. He analyses pricing strategies of duopoly manufacturers who produce 
differentiated products and duopoly retailers who sell both products and carry out store 
differentiation strategies. Both product and store differentiation are assumed to be horizontal 
and, like the previous work, three games are considered (vertical Nash, manufacturer 
Stackelberg, and retailer Stackelberg). The assumed demand function is adjusted in such a 
way as to explicitly take into account the two differentiation levels (introducing two 
parameters, for the product and store differentiation) and to overcome the contradictory 
results of the previous model as regard profit channel and differentiation. The Stackelberg 
games are quite different from the previous article because, besides the vertical competition, 
two horizontal levels of competition must be modelled; the manufacturer level and the 
retailer level. Accordingly, the equilibrium concept employed is the sub game-perfect 
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Stackelberg equilibrium. Results attained by the model are summarised in the following 
seven propositions (Choi, 1996: pp. 125-129): 
 A Stackelberg channel leadership by either manufacturer or retailer results in higher retail 
prices than those of the Nash game. 
 Given a set of differentiation parameters, a channel member benefits by playing the 
Stackelberg leader at the expense of the other channel member who becomes the follower. 
 Total channel profit is larger when there is no channel leadership. However, vertical Nash 
is not a stable structure, because each channel member has an incentive to become a 
leader. 
 Wholesale prices (retail margins) increase as products (stores) are more differentiated. On 
the other hand, wholesale prices (retail margins) decrease as stores (products) are more 
differentiated. Overall, retail prices increase as products and stores are more differentiated. 
 Product (store) differentiation benefits manufacturers (retailers), but at the same time hurts 
retailers (manufacturers). Therefore, manufacturers want more product differentiation and 
less store differentiation, while the retailers want the reverse. 
 Product (store) differentiation and the manufacturer (retailer) Stackelberg leadership have 
positive synergy effect on the manufacturer (retailer) profits. 
 The total profit-maximizing combinations of product and store differentiations are not 
stable because each channel member has an incentive to differentiate unilaterally. 
 
These results are consistent with the general wisdom that differentiation is used to mitigate 
price competition and that it tends to produce negative welfare effects. In the analysed case 
the combined vertical-horizontal competition produces non-stable equilibria that fail to 
maximise the total channel profit as consequence of the conflicting interests of retailers and 
manufacturers, and therefore opening the question whether a cooperative solution could lead 
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to welfare improvements. Moreover, the sketched channel structure fits the current situation 
of food marketing channels, either for the double level of differentiation or for vertical power 
asymmetry that pushes towards non-cooperative vertical forms of coordination, where both 
parties seek to take the leadership (and retailers actually seem to accomplish it).  
 
Avenel and Caprice (2006) model a vertical structure with a vertically differentiated duopoly 
at the manufacturer level and two retailers who differentiate through the chosen product line 
(i.e., each of them sell one or both the high and the low quality offered by manufacturers). 
The focus is on the analysis of the effects of different vertical contractual arrangements on 
product line differentiation, given different setting of vertical strategic interaction and 
different levels of costs for quality. Even if this model seems to better apply to the non- 
grocery sector (in that the assumption of manufacturer channel as leader and the kind of 
contractual arrangement that are examined, that is, exclusive dealing, vertical integration, and 
franchise fee), it can be of some interest for those segments of food market, such as the new 
functional and nutraceutical products, that imply a vertical differentiation strategy fed by 
heavy sunk investments in research and development by powerful food companies. 
 
Choi and Couglan (2006) investigate the positioning problem of private labels considering 
the differentiation strategies carried out by national brands, and the consequent product-line 
pricing strategies carried out by the retailer. They model a manufacturer Stackelberg game 
where the manufacturer determines the wholesale price and the quality level of his national 
brand and the retailer chose: 
 The optimal level of vertical differentiation of her store brand from the national brand. 
 The degree of substitutability between the national and the store brand. 
 The retail margin for the national brands. 
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 The price of the store brand.  
 
The equilibrium concept is a sub-game perfect equilibrium in which the second stage price 
equilibrium is reached immediately after the differentiation decisions. In order to 
simultaneously take into account the effect of horizontal and vertical differentiation the 
demand function used in the model is derived from a consumer utility function that contains a 
preference parameters for each product (vertical differentiation) and a parameter measuring 
the degree of substitutability with respect to other products. The results of the model for the 
case of two national brands and one store brand suggest that if the quality levels of the two 
national brands are equal and they are substantially horizontally differentiated, imitating 
either brand is optimal for the private label. However, when the national brands are allowed 
to be vertical differentiated, the private label is better off imitating the higher quality brand. 
Positioning in between is never an optimal solution. In contrast, when the two national brands 
are horizontally undifferentiated the private label better response is to horizontally 
differentiate from both national brands. A consequence of these results is that the more the 
national brands differentiate, the more store brands carry out imitative strategies leading to 
head-to-head competition that pushes national brands towards further differentiation and/or 
advertising investments. Because high differentiation and advertising investment are sources 
of market power, these findings are consistent with that store brand literature that have 
suggested that the anticompetitive effects of store brands can be greater than the competitive 
ones (Cotteril and Putsis, 2000; Kim and Parker, 1997, 1999). 
 
To complete this short review of the main findings attained so far from the literature on 
differentiation and marketing channels, it is worth quoting a recent study by Ellickson (2006) 
who empirically applies Sutton's theory of endogenous sunk cost and vertical differentiation 
 14 
to the supermarket industry in the US. During the 1980s and 1990s, the consolidation process 
in this industry has been driven by the introduction of innovative automated distribution and 
procurement systems. If one assumes that the level of concentration is determined by the 
economies of scale and scope associated with these innovations, as markets grow (and these 
economies are exploited) the level of concentration should decrease. In contrast, in about 50 
spatially defined markets in the US, the evidence is of a stable small number of firms (three 
to six) capturing the majority of the market, independent of the population; with a 
competitive fringe of smaller retailers capturing a minor share of the market (Ellickson, 
2006). Ellickson (2006) builds and tests a model demonstrating that such a structure is a real 
'natural oligopoly' stemming from a competitive game among the leader firms based on a 
growing vertical differentiation associated with increasing sunk costs. In his model, 
supermarkets compete by offering a greater variety of products (where variety is considered 
as a purely vertical form of product differentiation). This implies larger stores and therefore 
larger sunk costs that discourage entry by other firms. As a consequence, quality provided by 
the oligopolists (proxied by store size) should increase with the size of the market. In other 
terms high concentration and escalation in quality seem to be both characteristic features of 
the supermarket industry. 
 
Differentiation Opportunities in the Market for Fresh Produce 
 
The previous section has shown how, in order to maintain their competitive advantage, firms 
continuously increase their quality effort, either in the horizontal competitive game 
(manufacturers-to-manufacturers and retailers-to-retailers) or in the vertical competitive game 
(manufacturers-to-retailers). Once a differentiation strategy has initiated, it continues through 
time, especially when a quality (vertical) more than a feature (horizontal) differentiation is 
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involved. Consistent with the general findings of the economic theory, the channel literature 
suggests that vertical differentiation, more than the horizontal one, tends to be associated with 
a high degree of industry concentration and market power (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2002; 
White, 2000). In any case, the equilibria (prices and market structures) at any level of the 
channel depend on a complex interplay between strategies carried out at horizontal and at 
vertical level; power asymmetries between upstream and downstream firms; and the kinds of 
governance structures along the channel (Hingley, 2005a).  
 
With regards to the fresh produce sector, at least three hints can be drawn on these general 
findings described: 
 The sector of fresh produce offers retailers a wide range of possibilities to increase product 
variety, and therefore it can be a core category in the differentiating efforts carried out by 
supermarkets in the horizontal competitive arena. Examples of fresh produce variety 
improvement are: new format and packaging; standards  as organic, fair trade, non GMO, 
and so on; longer shelf life through bio and nano technologies or enhanced storage and 
handling systems; improved technological foods, such as functional and nutraceutical; IV 
Gamma products, de-seasonality, (i.e., making seasonal products available throughout the 
year); typical products with an origin denomination; and ethnic products. 
 Because the main fresh produce suppliers do not generally have their own supplier brand, 
in their differentiating strategies retailers do not have to take into account strategic 
reactions by the upstream counterparties; and hence are more able to entirely appropriate 
the competitive advantage stemming from the differentiation. 
 Because of the general weakness of the fresh produce sector structure, retailers can easily 
assume the leadership of the channel and therefore impose transaction governance forms 
that can accomplish the following goals: maximizing the channel profit; giving themselves 
 16 
the power of appropriating the larger share of the profit; and leading suppliers to comply 
with retailers' differentiating strategies without a real vertical contractual integration. 
 
Fresh Produce Markets and Distribution in the UK and Italy 
 
The multiple chain retailers dominate the market for fresh produce in the UK; they have the 
biggest market share in fresh fruit and vegetables providing 84 per cent of all UK retail sales 
(Mintel, 2005). There is steady growth in value sales of fresh produce in the UK, which 
marks it out against a general decline in most food commodities. This trend partly reflects the 
changing shopping habits of UK consumers, but is also driven by the proactive role the 
supermarkets have taken. The multiples are keen to develop their profile as suppliers of 
healthy eating products, but are also using various strategies to drive interest in the fresh 
sector, such as introducing exclusive new varieties or introducing new packaging. Mintel 
(2005) identify 'interest in fresh produce source and origin' from consumers, but, however, 
note that price most often determines purchase decisions, with supermarket competitive 
pressure forcing price and margins down. The 'everyday low pricing' strategies used by 
retailers have kept prices down across many basic categories. Such strategies enable the 
supermarkets to be seen to be offering value for money when compared to competitors. 
Building value in the fresh produce sector is difficult, and price therefore remains the main 
differentiator for the consumer. Also, the essential nature of some products means that some 
fruit and vegetables have been vulnerable to retail pricing strategies. However, branding and 
product differentiation will be of key importance to growth and adding value to the market. 
On this evidence, differentiating foods as being local and/or regional could therefore be 
beneficial to producers when marketing their produce and should enable them to obtain 
premium prices. 
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There is relatively little supplier proprietary branding in the UK fresh produce market. The 
availability and seasonality of fresh produce make it difficult for supplier branded produce to 
retain an on-shelf presence. Retailer own-branding has been of key importance to the 
development strategies of the multiples, who have segmented the fruit and vegetable market 
with their, for example, good/better/best/organic own-label ranges.  
 
In the UK, supermarkets (both directly and through their intermediaries) set both the agenda 
and the price for the rest of the supply chain (Hingley, 2005a). UK Growers feel that the price 
control exerted by dominant multiple retailers is having a profound effect on their industry, 
and are again looking to both new markets and external agencies for support on this matter. 
In the UK, differentiation takes place in the vertical competitive context.  
 
The UK fresh produce supply chain has undergone numerous changes in the last decade, with 
large supermarket retailers becoming increasingly powerful. The implementation of modern 
business practices has helped improve efficiency in the UK fresh produce supply chain. This 
has allowed the chain to break out of the commodity trap and take the fresh produce category 
out of the commodity trading environment (Fearne and Hughes, 2000: p. 120) by means of 
innovation and value creation (White, 2000). The overall trend is towards the UK fresh 
produce industry being dominated by a few large corporations operating on a national level, 
with some corporations even operating on a European or global scale. Most recently, the 
takeover of one of the largest UK food retailers, Safeway by Wm. Morrison, has resulted in 
four major supermarket chains (Tesco, Sainsbury, Wal-Mart-Asda, and Morrisons) 
accounting for three-quarters of retail grocery sales (IGD, 2005). Tesco take a third of the 
value of UK grocery sales alone. 
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A further development has been a change from market transactions to market relationships, 
networks, and interactions (Bourlakis, 2001; Hingley and Lindgreen, 2002; Lindgreen and 
Hingley, 2003; Lindgreen, 2003; Kotzab, 2001). From the retailer perspective (and largely 
initiated by them) has been the development of category management as a key managerial 
tool (Lindgreen et al., 2000). O'Keefe and Fearne (2002), for example, contend that their 
analysis of the application of category leadership in the fresh produce industry by UK retailer 
Waitrose shows that it is possible to successfully apply an integrated network-based 
relationship approach to what was considered to be a commodity sector.  
 
Category management (where a preferred supply takes greater responsibility for the entire 
supply chain of a given product category) has become universally applied by retailers. The 
premise is that category management facilitates greater levels of collaboration in vertical 
supply channels and underpins relationship development (Barnes, McGrath, and Pinnock, 
1995). This occurs where a single (lead) supplier organizes the supply (from all the suppliers) 
of a given product category to the retailer. However, such initiatives are seen by some to be 
simply moving risk and cost onto the supplier and away from the retailer (Allen, 2001). This 
is an argument put forward by Dapiran and Hogarth-Scott (2003) who contend that the 
development of category management has not necessarily increased cooperation in supply 
chains and can be used by retailers to reinforce power and control. 
 
Retailers are looking for fewer and larger suppliers who can work with them in vertical 
'partnership' (Hingley, 2001; White, 2000). This approach delivers considerable advantages 
for retailers, in that they can influence entire food channels for given products through 
singular dyadic interfaces with nominated channel leading intermediaries or 'super-
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middlemen' (Hingley, 2005a). Reducing the number of points of contact for supply not only 
derives benefits in terms of transaction cost savings, but also relational benefits in dealing 
with fewer, but closer 'partner' suppliers. This has resulted in an overriding trend towards 
supply chain concentration of a market determined by the standards of large-scale retailers. 
  
In Italy, fresh produce accounts for more than the 24 per cent of the total value of agricultural 
production (valued at prices received by farmers), and contributes to the positive part of the 
food trade balance sheet; with a self-sufficiency rate equal to 114 per cent. Notwithstanding 
this positive data, the Italian fresh produce industry is in the middle of a deep crisis. In its last 
report on the industry the CIA (2006), the main farmers union reported the loss of Italian 
leadership in the European market. During the last 10 years, the Italian share of the total fresh 
produce markets of European partners (EU 15) has continuously decreased; meanwhile 
imports into Italy registered a sharp increase of 56 per cent from the EU-25 and of 112 per 
cent from outside the EU. The loss of competitiveness has been due to the enduring weakness 
of production structure (small firms) and to poor logistic structures compared with the recent 
consolidation and innovation processes within Italy's traditional competitor (Spain) and in the 
new fresh produce specialised countries (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey). Also, new 
entrants to the European fresh produce market like China, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay 
seem to be stronger on the both levels of structures and organisation.  
 
When asked how to overcome this crisis and recover a leading position in the domestic as 
well as the export market, farmers associations, experts, and public officers of the Ministry 
for Agriculture all give three simple answers: horizontal integration at agricultural level for 
achieving network externalities in the production and selling activities; quality improvement 
and better exploitation of the comparative advantages Italian producers have with respect 
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weather, natural conditions, and product variety; and better relationships with big retailers 
that sell more 60 per cent of the production and are the only actors in the distribution channel 
that actually can 'persuade' consumers to reward the Italian product.  
 
Differentiation strategies by leading supermarkets along with a preference for Italian 
suppliers could help Italian farmers to exit the crisis. Evidence from both consumers' attitudes 
and retailers' marketing strategies seem to indicate that this is a practicable way. It is 
interesting to note also that collaborating growers in Southern-Italy are taking the branding 
initiative in fresh produce, whereby most recently in Sicily a consortium of Sicilian fruit 
growers from the Calatino south Simeto District have unveiled a new brand  Puraterra. The 
name is a reference to the pure soil and the high quality of the organic produce, cultivated on 
a total area of 100,000 hectares. Blood oranges, grapes, cactus figs, peaches, and artichokes 
will be supplied under the new brand (Anonymous, 2007). 
 
A recent survey by INDICOD (http://www.indicod-ecr.it/) on consumer preferences for fresh 
produce shows at least five notable attitudes:  
 As regards product attributes consumers rank this as follows: i. sensory attributes (taste, 
appearance and smell); ii. price; iii. convenience (time and energy saving in food 
shopping, storage and preparation disposal); and iv. origin and traceability. 
 As regards organic products, almost half of the sample bought these at least once in the 
last month. 
 When explicitly asked, 65 per cent of consumers disclose their preference for Italian 
products. 
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 60 per cent of consumers in the sample are happy with the non-packaged, unbranded 
display of produce with free service, but would like to receive more information on origin 
and product characteristics. 
 Young women in the sample are strongly interested in convenience attributes of produce, 
with a high willingness to pay for it. 
 
Currently in Italy the market for produce is led by supermarkets, nevertheless with a still 
large share (about 38 per cent) covered by traditional trade. Over the past 15 years, 
supermarkets carried out a price-based competition, enhancing procurement efficiency 
(mainly by operating their own distribution centres) and shrinking suppliers' margins. This 
led to the substitution of Italian suppliers (with poor production structure and management 
capability) with foreign suppliers (mainly Spanish) that better fit buyer organisational and 
cost needs. Nevertheless, some changes recently occurred with a growing attention for 
differentiation and local procurement policies. 
 
Currently, about 55 per cent of the Italian grocery market is covered by five groups with the 
following shares: Coop Italia 17.1 per cent; Carrefour Italia (with four different flags/formats 
Carrefour, GS, Diperdì, Docks Market), 10.4 per cent; Auchan, 9.6 per cent; Conad, 6 per 
cent; and Esselunga, 8.3 per cent (Dati IRI, 2006). During the last 10 years, all these leading 
groups, except Auchan, launched an own-branded line of high quality fresh produce, and an 
own-branded line of organic fresh produce. Moreover, both Carrefour and Conad started a 
line of Italian traditional product ('Terre d'Italia' for Carrefour, and 'Percorso Italia' for 
Conad) and all increased the offer of IV gamma products (fresh cut, prepared, dressed, and 
ready-to-eat), with a growing range and larger display.  
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Summarising the Italian market for fresh produce, there seems to be split between an 
unbranded/undifferentiated segment, where sensorial attributes and price are the key 
leverages of competition; and a highly differentiated/ semi-branded segment, where quality, 
variety, origin, convenience, and every sort of added value are the keys elements for 
obtaining premium prices and competitive advantages. The second segment, of course, might 
be the one interesting for Italian growers struggling to maintain their market shares. 
 
Methodology 
 
It was decided to approach the question of product differentiation in vertical channel 
structures using a single dyadic case approach, in which a primary producer is engaged in 
'partner' supply to a principal category management intermediary for channel leading multiple 
retailers. It is believed that this constitutes the most appropriate method to emphasise detail, 
depth, and insight, as well as understanding and explanation (Patton, 1987; Sayre, 2001). In 
this research, semi-structured, personal interviews were used allowed in order to facilitate 
respondents' thoughts, opinions, attitudes, and motivational ideas. The two organisations, 
which form the key vertical channel interaction, were selected for their ability to contribute 
new insights, as well as in the expectation that these insights would be replicated (Perry, 
1998). The cases were selected for reasons of being typical examples (Miles and Huberman, 
1994; Patton, 1987) of fresh produce supply (the grower) and fresh produce category 
management intermediary (the buying and value adding organisation in 'partnership' with 
multiple retailer customers). Interview questions were standardised around a number of topics 
(Dibb et al., 1997). Questions were kept deliberately broad to allow interviewees as much 
freedom in their answers as possible (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The findings are taken from 
the words of the respondents themselves, thereby aiding the aim of the research, whilst 
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gaining much more information than would have been available from alternative research 
methods (Corbin and Strauss, 1998). Within-case analysis involved writing up a summary of 
each individual case in order to identify important case level phenomena.  
 
The principal areas for exploration identified in the preceding literature are the following two 
ones: the impact of vertical competition on channel coordination; and competitive advantage 
through value-adding in vertical chains (cost leadership and differentiation strategies through 
branding, production and technological systems, and seasonal variation opportunities). 
 
Case Findings 
 
The two halves of the vertical-channel dyad are as follows. FP Marketing (name changed for 
reasons of anonymity) is the central marketing organisation for its own and associated 
growers produce against customer programmes and is based in the UK, with an annual sales 
turnover of over 100 million euros. It coordinates crop production and volumes both in the 
UK and overseas, and supplies consolidated and value-added (packaged) fresh produce to 
large multiple retailers in the UK, under retailers' own-label. 90 per cent of their business is 
in supply to UK multiple retailers, the remainder constitutes product that does not meet 
retailer specifications, and is marketed to UK wholesalers or processors. The group also has 
is own transport company. The product range is protected (e.g., glasshouse) fresh produce 
crops (tomatoes, cucumbers, peppers, and so forth) from UK, Northern Europe, and Eastern 
Europe and the same range from protected/unprotected sources in Southern Europe. The 
emphasis for this study is on tomato production and marketing, and the vertical relationship 
of a tomato producer and value-adding intermediary to multiple retailer customers.  
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FP Grower (name changed for reasons of anonymity) is a southern Italy-based family grower 
business of some 20 types of fresh produce, most notably tomatoes, and has an annual sales 
turnover of 10 million euros. They have 180 ha, (80 ha glasshouse and 100 ha open field, in 
order to manage demand throughout the year). They grow and undertake primary value-
adding functions (washing and basic packing in preparation for delivery). Their principal 
dedicated and 'partner' customer is FP Marketing. 60 per cent of their product goes to 
intermediaries like FP Marketing and 35 per cent direct to retailers, with the remainder 5 per 
cent to wholesale markets. 80 per cent of FP Grower's customers are overseas (UK, Austria, 
Switzerland, and Germany). FP Marketing does invest some funds in varietal and agronomic 
development in southern Italy, but own no means of production in the region. The two 
organisations concerned in this case analysis are, therefore, separately owned and managed. 
Interviews with FP Marketing concerned the commercial director and development director, 
and interview with FP Grower concerned the commercial director.  
 
FP Marketing are a category management supplier to UK multiple retailer chains. As the 
category management process has evolved in the UK, their principal retail customers have 
pushed FP Marketing to focus and category manage the supply of fresh produce protected 
crops, hence they have foregone their interests in other crops (for example, in leafy salads), 
but have gained business in (notably) tomatoes. This meant that FP Marketing was able to 
expand their remit, responsibilities, and sourcing of tomatoes on behalf of their predominant 
retail customers: 
We have got northern European growers, right the way from Belgium to the UK. We have 
now expanded into Poland for new sources, and that covers the UK seasonal 
supply/demand. (FP Marketing) 
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What the category management system does is allow retailers to coordinate category supply 
through category leaders like FP Marketing. The intermediary organisation benefits from 
more business, but must take on an enhanced role and associated responsibilities, and this is 
becoming increasingly expensive for suppliers. However, FP Marketing does see this as part 
of a (service-based) value-adding process: 
We have to provide services; we have to provide more resources. That is our added value 
to the customer. We supply all that technical (input), the agronomists, the ideas, the trials, 
the NPD, all of this development. There is not a charge for that. (FP Marketing) 
 
Multiple retail chains will specify quality assurance through determination of produce from 
accredited sources. These are normally European baseline production standards, 
environmental growing conditions, and so forth; and different customers in different 
countries may expect variations by different accredited standards. FP Grower, for example, 
offers four types of certifications, including EUREPGAP, and is trialling a limited acreage of 
organic certified produce. With respect to further utilising quality and production systems as 
a means of market differentiation, UK retailers have developed their own further standards, 
additional to or inclusive of baseline accreditation: 
[Named UK retailer] have got a (named variety of) Cherry tomato, and we grow that for 
them. And [a] particular grower has got [additional] standards in his greenhouse. Normally 
it is EUREPGAP standard throughout the industry, but [named grower] has gone the next 
level which is [named retailer's standard]. This is the next level in terms of technical 
excellence. (FP Marketing) 
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Production and quality standards are also important to FP Grower, but he sees that variations 
in environment standards, as well as other areas such as diverse labour laws not controlled by 
retail customers, as frustrating and undermining: 
Foreign competitors [i.e., growers in other countries] take advantage from different labour 
regulations and different pesticide/use regulations, without a real policy of price and 
quality transparency being carried out by retailers. Product from [named countries] with 
low food safety standards is arriving […] and sold in Italian supermarkets without clear 
information on its origin. (FP Grower) 
  
The category management role for FP Marketing includes managing the seasonal supply of 
product that takes in northern European protected crop (as described above), but also that 
from southern Europe. Equally important is devolved responsibility for product 
differentiation. Access to southern Italian tomatoes (typified by that produced by FP Grower) 
allows this differentiation. This region is notable for vine ripened tomatoes. These are 
specific variety, late-harvested (left on the vine until very red, mature, and full-flavoured). 
This source allows distinct advantages in variety, climatic conditions, and grower expertise 
not possible in northern Europe in order to produce a product with distinct taste and flavour 
advantages: 
Generally [the advantage is a] combination of better growing conditions, lower growing 
costs, and the growth technique, the tomato speciality technique [...] by harvesting 
something on the vine you can take it to the next stage of maturity it will give it that extra 
shelf life, flavour, and life advantage. The flavours and varieties they [southern Italian 
growers] are producing are market leaders. (FP Marketing) 
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The motivation of FP Marketing is to try to add value to the products it supplies to 
supermarket customers in order to avoid the 'commodity-trap' of being in an unbranded 
business, in which retailer own-label is the predominant identity: 
In commodity areas supply is far greater than demand and by their nature supermarkets 
will use that against us. So, we work to try and put identity to products […] and try to add 
value to it, and try and raise awareness with our customer. We look at varieties and taste, 
we try not to be in value and standard (retail lines), our ideal aspiration is to be in 'special' 
and 'finest' (retail lines) […] because you can get a higher value for it. (FP Marketing) 
 
Remember, all of our products are our customers' [retailers'] own brand, there is no 
identity of our company. It is a way of promoting the grower, the variety, the techniques 
they are using and most importantly, the flavour. The flavours and varieties they are 
producing are market leaders. (FP Marketing) 
 
It is interesting to note that FP Grower does not share the FP Marketing's emphasis on 
product specialisation based on regionality. This may be a matter of perspective, where FP 
Marketing are sourcing produce from many countries, varieties, types, and production 
methods; and FP Grower sees his produce as simply tomatoes determined by general quality 
standards and procurement accountability.  
 
FP Grower's motivation is to find a wide market for his produce, whilst FP Marketing, with 
their category management-based interaction with retail customers identifies opportunities for 
sub-branding by regional identity: 
We have now got customers [i.e., UK retailers] who are even putting grower's names on 
the packs. (FP Marketing) 
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I think [that] they [UK retailers] see [sourcing from] Italy as a way of adding value. It is 
all a way of trying to sub-brand down to the grower. (FP Marketing) 
 
In this way, retail customers' (through the expertise and packaging operations of FP 
Marketing) in the UK are keen to differentiate for both UK and overseas (e.g., southern 
Italian) produce as a means of further value-added.  
 
In terms of branding, FP Grower does have a named identity, but as this is mainly used as an 
identifier on outer cases for wholesale and intermediary customers, brand identity does not 
appear on-pack at retailer level. If there is pack identity it is with the retailer's own-label 
brand. FP Grower's customers collect product (using their own transport arrangements) from 
them at the farm, which is packed 'on demand' to customers' specification. As a result, FP 
Grower does not benefit from directly attributed brand identity. FP Grower's principal 
customer, FP Marketing, is responsible for all of the value-adding in terms of packaging and 
on-pack marketing for UK retail customers. FP Grower puts loose raw material (tomatoes) 
into plastic returnable trays. This is collected by FP Marketing's own transport to take the 
produce to the UK. It is there that further value-adding takes place in terms of consolidation, 
grading, and packing into punnets to the specification of specific retail customers under their 
brand identity. So, FP Marketing also does not have brand identity on-pack; value-adding for 
them is derived from the kind of service elements described above (continual sourcing 
throughout the seasons, new varietal sourcing, consolidation, packaging, new product 
development, and so forth).  
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The vertical channel arrangement between FP Grower and FP Marketing does offer FP 
Grower something that they do not have from other customer sources, and that is a 
contractual agreement: 
We have full exclusivity with them [FP Grower] in [for supply to] the UK. (FP Marketing) 
 
FP Marketing is supplied exclusively with tomatoes on the basis of an annual contract. 
The contract is signed in October before planting, and delivery of the product is from 
March until the following October. (FP Grower) 
 
As a result, FP Grower is happy with this arrangement as it provides security of business that 
is not forthcoming from other customers, who provide regular business, but not price 
stability: 
FP Marketing is the only customer who buys through contract. Other customers just order 
product when they need. For every order there is a price negotiation. The price is not 
stable because when products come from abroad [Spain and Morocco; FP Grower is near 
to ports in southern Italy]. The price falls suddenly, leaving no bargaining power. (FP 
Grower) 
 
The arrangement with FP Marketing is much the preferred way of doing business for FP 
Grower, as they are worried about: 
The excessive power of retailers who are not interested in collaborative agreements, but 
only look for lower prices and higher margins. (FP Grower) 
 
This may be a further reason why FP Grower has not developed customer markets dedicated 
to varietal type, production method, or regional association, as these things are more difficult 
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to achieve without further contractual/collaborative agreements. However, FP Grower is 
looking to expand through exploiting seasonal gaps with 'UK customers interested in winter 
production' and to add service value through 'further quality and logistic improvement'. They 
also have more long-term thoughts about horizontal and vertical integration of their own, 
through producer collaboration with other growers to sell direct to the public, via retailing of 
a producer group's own range of produce.  
 
Vertical coordination through a category management type system does have clear 
advantages for primary producers like FP Grower and intermediaries like FP Marketing, 
through the consistency of a planned contractual arrangement. As this further develops, this 
can allow further market differentiation (through, for example, production method or varietal 
specialisation or emphasis on regional identity). However, control remains firmly in the 
hands of the multiple retailer customers, whose name and identity value-adding services are 
conducted in: 
Supermarkets are very cute [clever], they outsource some of their work to us. We do their 
work for them, whether it in inventory, in marketing, in procurement. We are continually 
doing that, so it is a cost that we are bearing. (FP Marketing) 
 
Fresh produce is still very price sensitive and commodity suppliers/supply chains 
substitutable, and it is easy to enter the commodity fresh produce market in supply to 
retailers: 
It [category management] is very beneficial, but that does not take away from the fact that 
we live and work in a very marginal [profit] industry. (FP Marketing) 
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But category management-based supply does, in return provide some security, as it allows 
intermediaries and primary suppliers to add-value through service. Most of the value-adding 
services are conducted by the intermediary (in this case FP Marketing) and that allows more 
ownership of the business.  
 
FP Marketing do acknowledge that there may be scope for more of these value adding 
activities to take place closer to the country and point of production: 
If they [growers/grower groups] were able to produce a finished article in Italy, pre-
packed in a plastic tray, then you (they could) start driving costs out of the business. (FP 
Marketing) 
 
From this point Italian growers/grower groups could exploit Italian retail demand for value-
added products: 
If it works for us [value-adding] in northern Europe, why should it not work in the home 
market? And it is closer, the costs are lower, they can deliver into those markets [within 
Italy] a lot cheaper. (FP Marketing) 
 
However, FP Marketing are quick to point out that to supply the retail market outside of Italy, 
for example the UK, it would be much harder to replace what they do in terms of providing 
the consolidation (and all that requires in carrying a continual, multi-seasonal and vast range 
of products and sources); and all of the value-added services that large UK retailers' require.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
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The current competitive structure of the food system is such as to give strong incentives to 
differentiation strategies. Evidences from the economic literature on market differentiation 
suggest that the degree and the kind of differentiation (vertical/quality versus 
horizontal/feature) in the food marketing channel will depend on several interplaying factors: 
form and preference parameters of the demand function; competitive pressure at vertical and 
horizontal level; forms of vertical governance structures; and power asymmetries between 
upstream and downstream firms in the channel. In any case, differentiation is likely to be 
associated with high degree of concentration and market power. 
 
A theoretical general finding is that equilibria in differentiated markets are not stable and that 
a welfare assessment is difficult given that the net welfare effect of differentiation depends on 
the degree of market power (and the associated monopoly inefficiencies) owned by firms at 
equilibrium, the consumer preferences for differentiated products, and the form of the 
differentiation cost function. 
 
With regards the market for fresh produce it has been shown that a differentiation strategy in 
this sector might benefit retailers more than in other sectors, due to the absence of brand 
policies (and consequently of vertical conflicting strategies) by suppliers. Results from the 
presented case study seem to be consistent with the theoretical findings. In the sketched 
marketing channel made of the vertical channel interface between 'FP Grower' and 'FP 
Marketing' and the final retailer, the retailer is the leading actor of the differentiation policy 
and the one who mostly benefits from it. In the analysed case, it is identified that higher 
product differentiation can add value to the channel value. As predicted by the theory, the 
differentiation strategy can be carried out because the power asymmetry in the channel favour 
the party (the retailer) who possess the resources (consumer and market segmentation 
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information, economic strength, and managerial skill) required to making the differentiation 
policy succeed. The theory also predicts that the vertical governance form must be such as to 
give sufficient incentives to upstream channel partners to comply with the retailer 
differentiation policy. In the example, the performed annual contractual arrangement gives 
growers a benefit, in term of sales planning and assurance; which offsets the relationship 
disadvantages due to the retailer's buying power. The channel organisation also leaves the 
marketing intermediary (FP Marketing) the right incentives to incur the specific investment 
requested for the success of the differentiation policy. 
 
A general result of the study is that when retailers engage in product differentiation it is more 
likely that the terms of channel relationships shift from collaborative to competitive types 
with the power imbalance becoming the disciplinary means by which vertical coordination is 
achieved and maintained. As a consequence the relationship marketing idea that channel 
partners look for equitable collaborative relations seems to be contradicted by the evidence 
that for suppliers it could be wise agreeing to some inequity as the cost of doing business 
(Corsten and Kumar, 2005), especially when smart large retailers carry out successfully 
competitive strategies with positive spill over effects on the upstream firms. This viewpoint is 
concurred by Hingley (2005b) and Hingley, Lindgreen, and Casswell (2005) in analysis of 
fresh food chain supplier-supermarket relationships, where acceptance of channel asymmetry 
is advocated. Following this, the question to be answered is how much power is allowed for 
in the system without being a threat for the general social welfare and how to assess the 
anticompetitive effects of power imbalance in the channel in antitrust contexts?  
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